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.ARGU1\1ENT
The interests of children and their parents are not at cross purposes. Recognizing a
duty in this case protects them both while holding therapists accountable to meet the
standard of care. Child patients and their parents share a motivation and desire for
therapy to be carried out correctly. See Ca,yl S. v. Child & Adolescent Treatnient Servs.,

Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 661,666 (Sup. Ct. 1994) (noting that when abuse is alleged, it
"necessarily does[] affect both the child and his or her abuser, especially where a family
relationship is involved"). But where therapists are not accountable, therapy does not fare
as well. See Hunge,ford v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478, 482 (N.H. 1998) (''No social utility can
be derived from shielding therapists who make cavalier diagnoses that have profound
detrimental effects on the lives of the accused and their family."). 1
This Court should recognize that appellees ( collectively "Baird") owed a duty to
Mr. Mower. This is consistent with this Court's rulings in similar contexts which are in
harmony with the better-reasoned rulings from other jurisdictions. These rulings advance
balanced policies to protect patients while also protecting the reputation, emotional health
and parent-child relationships of their innocent parents. See Hunge1ford v. Jones, 722
A.2d 478, 480 (the court must be "vigilant in balancing these critical societal interests
against the need to protect parents, families, and society from false accusations of sexual
abuse.").
1

See also Tuman v. Genesis Assocs., 894 F. Supp. 183, 189 n.11 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (noting
"[t]here is a vast difference between using acceptable therapy to help a patient understand
emotional wounds suffered as a result of her parents' inadequate care giving [when
inadequate caregiving exists], and negligent techniques that create false memories of
severely abusive parenting that necessarily injure the parents and the patient").

1
SLC_3 l59778.1

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I.

The duty of confidentiality and to report do not offer immunity for negligent
therapy.
:Mr. Mower's claims are grounded in Baird's malpractice, not her report to Child

Protective Services of "potential abuse". 2 By citing to the therapist's duty to report
suspected abuse, and ''the imp01iance of therapist-patient confidentiality," Baird attempts
to commingle these concepts and bootstrap her negligent therapy into protected conduct.
Appellee Br. at 5- 7. But the reporting statute does not immunize a therapist whose
negligent therapy injured her patients or their parents. Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-410.
Recognizing this, the District Court properly refused to dismiss on the basis of immunity
in Utah's mandatory reporting statute. R. 93-94.
The objectives of therapist-patient confidentiality, though beneficial, also offer no
immunity from malpractice liability. 3 Baird's amici cite Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,
10 (1996), which emphasized the general imp01iance of patient confidentiality. Amici Br.
at 16. But the Jaffee Court recognized that the confidentiality privilege facilitates "frank
discussion in order to provide 'effective psychotherapy,' with the ultimate end aimed at
'successful treatment."' Johnson v. Rogers Afem '/ Hosp. Inc., 2005 \VI 114, il 62, 700
N.\V.2d 27 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10). As the court in Johnson correctly observed
'"[ w ]hen the end is divorced from the means, hO\vever, such that 'negligent therapy' is left
2

Baird's amici incorrectly state the issue, saying Mr. Mower asks this Court to recognize
a duty to third parties for "negligent care to a patient" that causes injury "'in reporting
suspected child abuse," and for "misdiagnosing sexual abuse" and subsequently
"reporting it to authorities." (Amici Br. at 1, 10.) Baird, however, concedes that 1v£r.
Mower "does not allege that his damages arise from TCC's report of potential abuse to
CPS .... " (Appellee Br. at 7.)
3
Appellee Br. at 5-6; Amici Br. at 16-19 (suggesting that a duty toward parents vwuld
undermine the purposes of the confidentiality privilege).
2
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to flourish within the confines of the therapist-patient relationship, the privilege no longer
serves its purpose." Id. Then "[w ]hat was meant to be a device to help care for problems
becomes a shelter to protect careless and negligent practices. The privilege cannot be
distorted in this manner." Id.
Unlike the decisions on which Baird relies, the Johnson court was not content
simply to assume that patient confidentiality has no policy exception when therapist
malpractice harms a parent. It compared the competing interests and found that an
exception applies in cases like this:
"Wbile we recognize the benefit from allowing therapists to diagnose and treat
victims of sexual and physical abuse as children, no utility can be derived from
protecting careless or inappropriate therapists and their practices. The costs are
simply too severe: the therapist is allowed to continue negligently "treating"
others, the patient remains disillusioned by the falsehoods, and the accused suffers
the torment of being branded a child-abuser. We do not hesitate to conclude that
mechanical application of the therapist-patient privilege to allow such results to
continue unimpeded ill serves the public."
Id. at~ 63. \Vith this in mind, the court added: "Considering the seriousness of being

falsely accused a child abuser, we remain 'quite confident that negligent treatment which
encourages false accusations of sexual abuse is highly culpable for the resulting injury."'
Id. at~ 65 (citing Sai1yer v. Midelfort, 595 N.\V.2d 423, 433 (\Vis. 1999)). This

culpability was found "to weigh in favor of recognizing a public policy exception to the
therapist-patient privilege." Id.
This exception is consistent with In B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West, where this Court
recognized a healthcare provider's duty to third parties even though the provider and his
amici voiced concerns about the duty's interference "with confidentiality in [the]

3
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physician-patient relationship" and disclosure of "confidential medical information."
2012 UT 11, 'if 37, 275 P.3d 228. To the Court, these concerns seemed "overblown". Id.
The Court noted the availability of protective orders and concluded that if any
imperfections in the law of physician-patient confidentiality exist, "the solution is to finetune that law, not to categorically foreclose the imposition of a duty," as Baird and her
amici request. Id.

II.

Baird misapplies the Jeffs elements which support the duty.
Acknowledging a duty to parents, as other courts have, is consistent ,vith Jeffs.

The Jeffs elements reinforce adoption of the duty.

A.

Baird engaged in active misconduct.

To appear outside Jeffs' scope, Baird casts her actions as "nonfeasance" (failure to
take positive steps to benefit others) rather than "misfeasance" (active misconduct
working positive injury to others). Appellee Br. at 10. Let us be clear-from March 2011
through October 2012, Baird affim1atively subjected the four-year-old child to negligent
"therapy," ostensibly eliciting memmies of pre-January 2011 events. R. 2, 7, 15. Each
4

affinnative "therapy" session was an act of misfeasance. Other acts included repeatedly

4

In these sessions Baird engaged in "diagnostic suspicion bias" by unde1iaking
investigative rather than therapeutic sessions, increasing the probability that she ,vould
see symptoms of sexual abuse even if no abuse occmTed. R. 14. Baird also engaged in
"confim1atory bias"; she actively sought information confimung her abuse hypothesis,
ignoring standardized tests, and she did not establish appropriate safeguards to ensure
that she did not engage in confirmatory bias. R. 9-11. Baird undertook and encouraged
through negligent "therapy" an affirmative investigation of sexual abuse against a parent
where the 1isk of harm ,,,as highly foreseeable. R. 17.
4
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5

interviewing the child and creating and fostering false memories of sex abuse, tainting
the child's memory, R. 8-16, and engaging in therapy without appropriate forensic
training, R. 9. Baird's repeated actions affirmatively harmed the parent-child relationship
and Mr. Mower personally. R. 19-21.
B.

Jeffs applies to Jvfr. Mower's non-physical injuries.

Baird also attempts to distance Jeffs, contending that Jeffs applies only to a
foreseeable physical injury. Appellee Br. at 11. This is incorrect. First, the Jeffs Court did
not limit its analysis or holding to physical injuries. The Court set about to determine the
"categorical" duty owed to third parties by physicians who prescribe medication. Id. at

,r 23. Though the Court discussed that duty in terms of the facts in Jeffs (the case
involved a physical injury to the plaintiffs' mother but not to the plaintiffs), the Comi did
not limit its ultimate holding on duty to any specific harm: "We uphold a duty of
healthcare providers to non-patients in the affirmative act of prescribing medication, and
reverse the district court's conclusion to the contrary." Id. at il 40. Because the duty was
reached as a "categorical" conclusion, the "duty question" did not "tum on the specific
combination of phannaceuticals" prescribed "or the particular iniurv that it alle12:edlv
caused." Id. at ,r 23 (emphasis added). "Rather, the duty analysis considers healthcare

5

"[E]ven the American Psychiatric Association [of which the Utah branch is an amici]
has issued warnings about the possible creation of false memories through repeated
questioning." Jeffrey A. Mullins, Has Time Re1,vritten Eve1y Line?: Recovered-Memo1y
Therapy and the Potential Expansion of Psychotherapist Liability, 53 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 763, 796 n.259 (1996) (citing Sandra G. Boodman, The Professional Debate Over
an Emotional Issue, Wash. Post, Apr. 12, 1994, (Health), at 13, 14 (noting that American
Psychiatric Association issued a five-page policy statement warning that repeated
questioning may implant memories)).

5
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providers as a class, negligent prescription of medication in general, and the full ran2:e of
injuries that could result in this class of cases." Id. (emphasis added).
Second, the third parties to whom the provider in Jeffs \\'as found to owe a duty
suffered emotional injuries as a result of being left parentless, not physical harm. Id. at

,r 3. They were not deprived of a remedy. Like them, :Mr. Mower should not be deprived
of a remedy for his emotional injuries caused when Baird affirmatively provided
negligent care to his daughter. 6
C.

1'1r. :Mower's harm was foreseeable.

'The appropriate foreseeability question for duty analysis is whether a category of
cases includes individual cases in which the likelihood of some type of harm is
sufficiently high that a reasonable person could anticipate a general risk of injury to
others." Id. at~ 27. In the category of cases at issue (involving parents wrongfully
accused of child abuse suing their child's therapist for negligent therapy), the type of
hann involved is "sufficiently high" (indeed, it is virtually undisputed) such that all
reasonable people would anticipate a general risk of devastating injury to others like J\1r.
1'v1mver. "Certainly, the ham1 that may result from negligent false accusations is readily
foreseeable, while the burden of due care placed upon therapists is no greater than the
duty that substantially all professionals are required to meet." .Montoya v. Bebensee, 761
P .2d 285, 288-89 (Colo. App. 1988); see also Ca,}'l S. v. Child & Adolescent Treatnient
6

Baird's further contentions that acknowledging the therapist's duty to parents would
create an "unworkable" class, and would open a Pandora's box of "potentially unintended
consequences," are belied by the many well-reasoned decisions in states that adopted and
still apply the duty to third parties like 1v1r. Mower. See Appellant Br. at 16-25
(discussing cases in which a duty was applied).

6
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Servs., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 661, 666 (Sup. Ct. 1994) C'[B]eing labeled a child abuser [is]
'one of the most loathsome labels in society', and [there are] 'physical and psychological
ramifications' that may be 'attendant to

* * * addressing, defending and dealing with'

such accusations.") (quoting Rossignol v. Silveniail, 586 N.Y.S.2d 343, 345 (Sup. Ct.
1992)); Johnson v. Rogers lvfem 'I Hosp. Inc., 700 N.\V.2d 27, 42 (Wis. 2005) (finding
that "'negligent treatment which encourages false accusations of sexual abuse is highly
culpable for the resulting injury."') (citing Sa,?rer, 595 N.W.2d at 433). Even
jurisdictions not extending a duty to third parties recognize the undisputed nature of the
harm. See, e.g., Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Pa. 2000) (while
finding no duty, recognized "[t]o be falsely accused of sexual abuse is undoubtedly a
substantial harm, a harm which is readily foreseeable .... "). 7
Finally, Baird argues that 11r. Mower's lack of a "provider-patient" relationship
with Baird weighs against imposing a duty of care as there is no "special relationship."
Appellee Br. at 11. However, "[ o]utside the government context, ... a special
relationship is not typically required to sustain a duty of care to those who could
foreseeably be injured by the defendant's affim1ative acts." Jeffs, 2012 UT 11 at if 10
(citing Id. v. Univ. of Utah, 2005 UT 80, ,110, 125 P .3d 906). In fact, the Jeffs Court
found that "a special relationship or physician-patient relationship need not underlie the
defendants' duty to the plaintiffs . . . ." Id. at ~ 19.

7

Baird's foreseeability discussion, which cites but never analyzing the "general
relationship" between tortfeasor and victim and urges courts not "to concern themselves"
with foreseeable han11 to parents (who Baird calls "abusers"), misses this obvious point.
Appellee Br. at 11, 13.

7
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III.

Balanced public policies favor the duty and should foster protection for the
child and her parents.

Baird and her amici describe a series of general policy concerns to forecast the
ruin of therapy in Utah for potential victims of abuse under a duty to parents. Like
provider-defendants in prior cases, they predict that this duty (a duty involving the same
standard of care therapists already owed to patients, see ~Montoya By & Through ~~1ontoya
v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Colo. App. 1988)) would force therapists to succumb

to a preoccupation with potential liability C'a powerful disincentive") and abandon proper
diagnosis and treatment. Appellee Br. at 4-5, 17-19. They claim the duty would place
therapists in an "unfair double-bind"; incentivize them to "misdiagnose" in order to
"avoid liability"; and cause them to labor under a "suffocating restraint" that "imprnperly
invade[s] the therapist-patient relationship." Appellee Br. at 4-5, 17-19. 8
But neither Baird, her amici, nor the court rulings on ,,ihich they depend cite
evidence confim1ing the reality of this calamity in states which years ago adopted and
still apply the third-party duty to parents. They reference no proof from these
jurisdictions showing that because of the duty (a) therapists have fled or refuse (or even
hesitate) to diagnose potential abuse; (b) therapists refuse to treat children thought to

8

Baird and her amici employ such alarming characterizations in part as a sub-theme of
emotion. There are other examples: though Baird's diagnosis of abuse here ,x.ras
"unsupported," "unsubstantiated," R. 16, and negligently reached, Baird and her amici
frame the issue with language charged for effect as "[t]he rights of children versus the
rights of abusers" (Amici Br. at 11) and refer to Mr. Mower and innocent third pa1iies
like him as "the accused," "child abusers," and "third party, potential abusers." Appellee
Br. at 4, 7, 13. And while no instance of abuse is acceptable, Baird's amici cite studies of
questionable relevance to imply incon-ectly the existence of a raging epidemic of abuse,
all without disclosing the studies' limiting contexts. Amici Br. at 5-9.
8
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have been abused; (3) the limited third-party-duty exception to therapist-patient
confidentiality has undermined the therapist-patient relationship and prevents proper,
standard-compliant therapy; or (4) therapists' concerns over serving "two masters"
prevents standard-compliant diagnosis or therapy. This dearth of proof is perhaps the best
evidence that Baird's policy arguments do not foreclose the imposition of a duty.
Given this lack of evidence, it is not enough simply to quote statements from noduty jurisdictions that recite such concerns and just assume the predicted harm would
ensue. 9 Thus, the policies Baird advances as grounds for categorically rejecting the policy
here should be met with skepticism: "[P]ublic policy is a protean substance that is too
often easily shaped to satisfy the preferences of a judge rather than the \\,.ill of the people
or the intentions of the Legislature.... [T]he theory of public policy embodies a doctrine
of vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from
constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as a basis for judicial
determinations, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection." Penunuri v. Sundance

Partners, Ltd., 2011 UT App 183, if 15,257 P.3d 1049, affd, 2013 UT 22, if 26,301 P.3d
984 (quoting Rothstein v. Snowbird C01p., 2007 UT 96, 'iI 10, 175 P.3d 560 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

9

Judicial sensitivities may have been a factor in some abuse decisions. One author
considered early cases involving "repressed" memories of childhood abuse before the
notion was drawn into question and observed the following: '"Not wanting to appear
insensitive to the plight of abused children, the courts categorically accepted the validity
of "repressed" memory claims, as well as the therapeutic techniques used to extract
them." A. Garton, Reconciling the Incongruous Deniands of Therapist-Patient
Confidentiality and Falsely Accused Third-Parties, 37 Cumb. L. Rev. 77, 78-79 (200607).

9
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Prior predictions of havoc raised by mental health providers opposing a duty to
third parties in another context also did not pan out. Psychotherapists and their amici
raised similar policy concerns to oppose a duty to warn third-parties who may be victims
of patient violence. See Taraso.ffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 131 Cal. Rptr. 14,551
P.2d 334 (1976). Refusing to assume the validity of such predictions, and noting balanced
counteIYailing policies favoring the protection of third parties from violence, the Taraso.,(f
Court adopted the third-party duty. Id. A conclusion of a post-Tarasoff study of
psychologists and psychiatrists was that "[t]he Tarasoff decision, with its conditional
abrogation of confidentiality, did not result in the destruction of effecti\'e therapeutic
relationships as its critics had prophesied." D.\\7. Shuman, 1\1.S. \Veiner, The Privilege

Study: An Empirical Examination of the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege, 60 N.C. L.
Rev. 831,915 (1981-82) (discussing Note, Tft7zere the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of

Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasojf, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 165, 176 n.63,
177 n.67 (1978)).

10

Another author noted that the "'ultimate resulf' of the Tarasoff

Court's comparison of the "countervailing public concerns," and its finding that the
public's protection oun:veighed the confidentiality of patient communications, "has not
been the demise of the therapist-patient dynamic, but rather the heralding of a ne\v era of
accountability for psychologists and increased protection for vulnerable members of
10

\Vhile Baird's Amici cite an article for the proposition that some mental health care
providers grew reluctant to probe into areas of patients~ liYes dealing with violence after
Tarasojf, the same article noted contradictory data that "surveyed clinicians had not
decreased their contact with potentially violent patients as a result of Tarasoff." Amici
Br. at 20 (citing Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient:
_New Directions for the l 990s, 16 Law & Psychol. Rev. 29, 58, 58 n.172, 58 n.176
(1992)).

10
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society." A. Garton, Reconciling the Incongruous Demands of Therapist-Patient

Confidentiality and Falsely Accused n1ird-Parties, 3 7 Cumb. L. Rev. 77, 107 (2006-07).
Here in Utah, health care providers in Jeffs unsuccessfully offered a similar ''series
of general policy arguments against the imposition of a duty on physicians to nonpatients." See Jeffs, 2012 UT 11 at ,I32. They argued that the duty would:

(a)

diminish the availability of treatment (less available medication "by

inciting undue caution in physicians"), id. at~ 33; cf Appellee Br. at 5 (duty to parents
,-,;,,ould "set up barriers to diagnosis and treatment");
(b)

increase healthcare costs (because of increased malpractice rates), id. at

(c)

cause nonpatient lawsuits to inte1fere with physician-patient confidentiality,

~36;

id. at~ 37; cf Appellee Br. at 5-6 (duty would "undermine goals" of therapist-patient
privilege);
(d)

cause divided loyalty, id. at~ 38; cf Appellee Br. at 19 (therapist should

not serve two masters); and
(e)

wrongfully require providers to weigh notions of liability in the "complex"

world of medicine, id. at~ 39; cf Appellee Br. at 13 n. 7 (because therapy is an inexact
science, involving a therapist's "gray subjective sense," no duty should apply).
Like the comi in Tarasoff, the Jeffs Comi refused to assume that the duty would
spawn the disastrous outcome the providers predicted. Instead, it evaluated important and
balanced countervailing policies favoring nonpatients. It found that "the unquestioned
utility of pham1aceuticals is not enough to justify the general disavowal of a duty to use
11
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reasonable care in prescribing them." Id. at ,I 34. It noted that "[w ]hen potential risks
might outweigh potential benefits for a given activity, tort duties incentivize
professionals-,vhether physicians, mechanics, or plumbers-to consider the potential
hannful effects of their actions on both their clients/patjents and third pa.iii es." Id. The
Court felt the claimed concerns over confidentialitv were overstated and adeauatelv
.,

J.

.,

addressed through protective orders. Id. at ,r 3 7. As to concerns over "divided loyalty''
(two masters), the Court ruled that "'[e]ven if the doctor's loyalty is only to her patient,
the patients welfare encompasses an interest in minimizing a risk of causing ham1 to third
parties." Id. at~ 38. And while the Court did "'not doubt the complexity of the medical
professional' s sphere of judgment," it found that "the complexity of a pa11icular
profession does not typically justify the abdication of professional responsibility for
negligence." Id. at ,I 39.
After making this policy comparison, the Jeffs Court adopted the nonpatient duty.
And, again, neither Baird nor her amici cite evidence that this third-party duty spawned
debilitating tribulation within the physician-patient relationship in Utah as the providers
predicted.
Though the duty in Jeffs (to avoid injury to third parties through negligent
prescriptions) is not identical to the duty here (to avoid injury to a parent through
negligent therapy of a child), the Court's analysis and recognition of balanced
countervailing policies applies in large pa1t because equally important (indeed,
transcendent) countervailing policies favor adoption of a therapist's duty to parents:

12
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•

"While we recognize the benefit from allO\'ving therapists to diagnose and
treat victims of sexual and physical abuse as children, no utility can be
derived from protecting careless or inappropriate therapists and their
practices. The costs are simply too severe: the therapist is allowed to
continue negligently "treating" others, the patient remains disillusioned by
the falsehoods, and the accused suffers the torment of being branded a
child-abuser." Johnson v. Rogers Mem '/Hosp.Inc., 2005 \VI 114, ,r 63,
700 N.\V.2d 27;

•

"Charges of child abuse leveled against a parent and ineptly handled strike
at the core of a parent's basic emotional security, providing ample
justification for the imposition of liability." Tyner v. State Dep't of Soc. &
Health Servs., Child Protective Servs., l P.3d 1148, 1154 (Wash. 2000)
(quoting Gray v. State, 624 A.2d 479, 485 (Me. 1993));

•

\Vhen abuse is determined, it "necessarily does[] affect both the child and
his or her abuser, especially where a family relationship is involved. A
suspected abuser surely has the right to a reasonable expectation that such a
determination, touching him or her as profoundly as it will, will be
carefully made and will not be reached in a negligent manner." Ca1JJl S. v.
Child &Adolescent Treatment Servs., Inc., 614 N.Y.S.2d 661,666 (Sup.
Ct. 1994); 11

•

"It is indisputable that 'being labeled a child abuser [is] one of the most
loathsome labels in society' and most often results in grave physical,
emotional, professional, and personal ramifications ... This is particularly
so where a parent has been identified as the perpetrator. Even when such an
accusation is proven to be false, it is unlikely that social stigma, damage to
personal relationships, and emotional tum10il can be avoided." Hunge1ford
v. Jones, 722 A.2d 478, 480 (1998) (quoting Ca,yl S. v. Child & Adolescent
Treatment Servs., 614 N.Y.S.2d 661, 666-67 (Sup. Ct. 1994)). "Society also

11

Baird correctly notes that P.T v. Richard Hall C,nty. A1ental Health Care Ctr., 837
A.2d 436 (N.J. Super. 2002), holds no duty would extend to a third pa1iy alleged abuser,
even if they are family members (regrettably contrary to the characterization in
appellant's opening brief). However, the case recognizes the possibility of duty from a
therapist running to a custodial parent so long as the parent is not the alleged abuser. Id.
at 443-44 ("\Vhile it might well be true that in an intact family unit the duty of care
respecting treatment of the child might extend to both parents, in the situation in which
the family unit has been fractured and the child given over even temporarily to the
custody of one, there can be no duty of care to the non-custodial parent. And even in an
intact family unit, there can be no duty rnnning between the child's therapist and the
alleged abuser.").
13
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suffers because false accusations cast doubt on true claims of abuse, and
thus undermine valuable efforts to identify and eradicate sexual abuse." Id.
at 481. "·No social utility can be derived from shielding therapists who
make cavalier diagnoses that have profound detrimental effects on the lives
of the accused and their family."' Id. at 482 (quoting Althaus ex rel Althaus
v. Cohen, 710 A.2d 1147, 1157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998)).
•

.Any "public policy concerns with restricting a therapisf s choice of
treatments, and discouraging therapists to treat those who believe they may
have been sexually abused in the past out of fear of liability, 'overlooks the
fact that the standard of care by ,vhich a therapist~ s conduct is measured is
not heightened [by a third-party cause of action].~,, Sa11:yer v. lvfidelfort,
595 N.\V.2d 423, 435 (\Vis. 1999) (quoting Hunge,ford v. Jones, 722 A.2d
478, 481-82 (1998)).

•

The '·value placed on therapists ,;vho treat the sexually abused, ho,,rever,
should not overshadow the similarly important societal goal of protecting
innocent parents against spurious accusations of child abuse." A. Garton,
Reconciling the Incongruous Demands of Therapist-Patient Confidentiality
and Falsely Accused Third-Parties, 37 Cumb. L. Rev. 77, 78 (2006-07)
( citing Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Pa. 2000)).
"By implementing methods that facilitate the discovery and purging of
negligent therapists, such as refusing to allow negligent practitioners to
hide behind the cloak of confidentiality, more caution will be exercised
when designing a treatment plan, thus improving the standard of care for
treating victims of abuse." Id. at 108-09.

Compelling and balanced policies like these and those described in Jeffs, policies
protecting both parent and child, drive the conclusion here that mental health care
professionals must avoid using inappropriate techniques and use "reasonable professional
judgment" to limit the possibility of false mem01ies, or be liable to the patient's parents
for the false mem01ies created. Roberts v. Salmi, 866 N.\\T.2d 460, 473-74 (Mich. App.
2014); see also Webb v ..:Veuroeducation Inc., 88 P.3d 417,423 (\\Tash. Ct. App. 2004);

Smqer v. ~Midelfort, 595 N.\V.2d 423, 435 (Wis. 1999). 12

12

Significantly, Baird acknowledges passage of Utah Code .Ann. § 78B-3-426, which
14
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Moreover, a "malpractice action by an injured third party would be the best course
of action from a policy standpoint because it would serve as a quality control device in
the field of psychotherapy. Therapists would not be subject to unlimited liability because
courts would judge them by the standard of care that applies to other mental health
professionals." Sheila F. Rock, A Claim for Third Party Standing in A1alpractice Cases

Involving Repressed A1em01y Syndrome, 37 \X/m. & Mary L. Rev. 337, 359 (1995).

13

This

result is fully consistent with Jeffs' balanced-policy analysis as already shown.

IV.

Baird's additional authority.
The better reasoned approach for protecting children and parents with balanced

policies is not undermined by the additional decisions from no-duty states that Baird and
her amici cite. First, as noted, none of the rulings cites proof in jurisdictions applying the
duty showing that therapy for abuse is anything but effective and available. They identify
no evidence suggesting that the devastating results predicted by the policies they recite
have occurred.
Second, from a sheer numerical perspective, Baird's amici claim fourteen states
bold that no duty exists: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Texas. Amici Br at 10.

14

However, Baird only lists thirteen, omitting South Carolina.

imposes a duty on health care providers to third parties in future Utah matters. Appellee
Br. at 8-9 n.2.
13
\Vhile this article discussed "repressed" memories of abuse, the principle is applicable
in this context as well where negligent therapy creates false accusations of sex abuse.
14
Baird's amici say that Mr. Mmver asserts that only seven states impose no duty. The
"no-duty" cases Mr. Mower initially described ,,,ere just those relied upon by the trial
15
SLC_3159778.l

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellee Br. at 20. A.nd the South Carolina decision, Bishop

l'.

S. C. Dep !t of1,1enial

Health, 331 S.C. 79, 502 S.E.2d 78 (1998), does not hold that third parties are barred

from suing medical providers. It found that a third-party may assert claims against a
physician for malpractice under limited circumstances. Id. at 92. Bishop is also
distinguishable because, unlike this case, it involved a government entity and claims
regarding a failure to warn. Id. at 86.
Rulings that Baird and her amici cite from another five jurisdictions are also
inapplicable. They claim Arkansas rejected a duty to parents, citing Cund(ff r. Crider,
303 Ark. 120, 123, 792 S. \V.2d 604, 605 (Ark. 1990t a case involving alleged libel for
reporting suspected abuse, not negligent therapy. More recently, ~Arkansas acknowledged
that nonpatient third parties have claims against medical care providers for injuries
resulting from the providers' improper treatment of a patient. See Fleniing v. Vest, 2015
.Ark. App. 636, 5,475 S.\V.3d 576,580 ("'In recognizing the breadth of the definition of
·medical injury[]' [in the medical malpractice statute,] our supreme court has made it
clear that a nonpatient third party may sue a medical care provider for injuries sustained
as a result of a patient's improper treatment.") ( citing Dodson v. Charter B eha1'ioral

Health Sys. ofNw. Ark., Inc., 335 ;\rk. 96, 983 S. \V.2d 98 ( 1998) (stating that medical
malpractice "lay at the very heart" of the plaintiffs claim when decedent \\ as killed by a
1

suicidal driver which \"vent undiagnosed at the moment because of a breakdO\vn in

court. See Appellant Br. at 18 ("Other courts (those cited by the District Court) disagree .
. . ."). However it is true that there is a close nationwide split on the issue on appeal.
16
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communication between the defendant hospital and patient)). Arkansas is thus more
appropriately a duty state in certain contexts.
In citing JA..H. ex rel. R.MH. v. Wadle & Assocs., P.C., 589 N.\1/.2d 256, 264-65
(Iowa 1999), a case concerning a child's claim against a therapist for lost parental
consortium caused by negligent treatment, Baird's amici fail to note that the court's
finding that no duty ran to nonpatient family members was expressly limited to its
"'holding to the facts of [the] case." Id. Moreover, the court's findings that the treatment
was not negligent and did not damage the parent-child relationship make it difficult for
Baird to cast Iowa as a no-duty state. Id. at 261-262.
Russell v. Adams, 125 N.C. App. 637,640,482 S.E.2d 30, 32-33 (1997), involves

mental illness, not child abuse. Baird appears to cite Russell for its holding that health
care providers as a broad category only owe a duty to patients. But this type of case
cannot be viewed in isolation or grouped with no-duty states on the issue of a therapist's
duty toward parents; a number of other jurisdictions either recognize or have not ruled
out a general duty to third parties for health care providers, including:
•

Oregon (Zavalas v. State By & Through Dep't of Corr., 124 Or. App. 166,
173-74, 861 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1993) ("[\V]e reject defendant's position that
under no circumstances can a physician ever be liable to a nonpatient third
party."));

•

Delaware (Naidu v. Laird, 539 A.2d 1064, 1072 (Del. 1988) ("The
Delaware statutes concerning the care of the mentally ill do not fully define
all the duties of mental health professionals. These statutes do not eliminate
17

SLC_3159778.l

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the common law duty to use reasonable care in the treatment and discharge
of mentally ill patients to protect against reasonably foreseeable events."));
•

Florida (Pate 1·. nirelkel, 66 i So. 2d 278, 280, 282 (Fla. i 995)

c;·we

conclude that when the prevailing standard of care creates a duty that is
obviously for the benefit of certain identified third parties and the physician
kno\\1S of the existence of those third parties~ then the physician's duty runs
to those third parties.~~));
e

Tennessee (A1athes v. DRD Knoxrille .Med. Clinic, No. E2010-01809-COAR3CV, 2011 \VL 1402879, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2011)
(unpublished)

15

("A number of Tennessee Supreme Court cases have held

that a medical provider may m;ve a duty of care to non-patient third parties
for injuries caused by the medical provider's negligence if the ham1 which
occurred \\1as reasonably foreseeable.")).
Hite v. Br01rn, 100 Ohio App. 3d 606, 606-10, 654 N.E.2d 452,454 (1995), is

another inapplicable abuse-reporting case which did not concern negligent therapy. Other
authority from Ohio holds that a duty to a third party can be imposed by a health care
provider if a special relationship to the patient exists ,vhen one takes charge of a person
whom he knows or should know is likely to cause bodily ham1 to others if not controlled.
Jenks v. City of W. Carrollton, 58 Ohio App. 3d 33, 37, 567 N.E.2d 1338, 1343 (1989).

15

Pursuant to Rule 30(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a copy of this
decision is attached as Appendix 1.
18
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Myers v. Lashley, 2002 OK 14, il 25, 44 P.3d 553, as amended (Mar. 20, 2002), is
also an abuse-reporting case where the no-liability holding was based on statutory
immunity for those reporting suspected abuse. A1yers and Baird's other cases just
discussed, do not undermine the better reasoned approach for protecting children and
parents with the balanced policies described above. See Section III supra.
V.

l\1r. l\1ower may recover for direct injuries without regard to other claims.
Baird says that Jvlr. Mower "essentially" asserts other theories which should serve

in place of a negligence claim against her. Appellee Br. at 26. 16 But Jvlr. Mower may
assert claims for malpractice against Baird for his direct injuries, as other courts have
recognized. A. Garton, Reconciling the Incongruous Demands of Therapist-Patient

Confidentiality and Falsely Accused Third-Parties, 37 Cumb. L. Rev. 77, 100 (2006-07)

("In rooting the claim in direct injury rather than injury to familial relationship, the
Sa11yer court was able to differentiate this cause of action from previous loss of
companionship complaints, which enabled it to move beyond the prima facie case and
rule on the controversial public policy aspects of third party claims.") (citing Sav1,:ver v .

.Midelfort, 595 N.\V.2d 423,432 (Wis. 1999)); see also Section III supra.
Baird also overlooks that a claim for loss of consortium under Utah Code Ann.

§ 30-2-11 requires significant, permanent, and lifestyle changing injury, such as "a partial
or complete paralysis of one or more of the extremities," "significant disfigurement," or
"incapability of the person of pe1farming the types of jobs the person perfonned before
the injury." Utah Code Ann.§ 30-2-1 l(l)(a). If the claim relates to lost consortium of a
16

See also Amici Br. at 25 (same).
19
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child, under Benda v. Catholic Dioceses, the child must experience the same injury set
forth in Utah Code .Ann. § 30-2-11. 2016 UT 3 7 at, 2. These injuries are absent here.
\Vhile a defamation claim might exist, stigmatization and harm to reputation are
factors infom1ing a calculation of damages in tmi, including negligence/malpractice. See,

e.g., Jorgensen v. A1ass. Port Authority, 905 F.2d 515, 520 (1st Cir. 1990) ("Defamation
is a type of tortious injury. Injury to reputation is a particular item of damages. \Ve are
not convinced that ... damages for injury to reputation may only be recoYered in a
defamation action."); Kennedy v. _HcKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500,448 N.E.2d 1332 (1983)
(allov,~ing recovery of damages for injury to reputation on negligence claim); see also
Utah Const., Art. I, § 11 (listing injury to reputation as a separate and distinct source of
remedy: "All comis shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law .... " ( emphasis
added)). Ultimately, the existence of one alternate theory does preclude others,
pa11icularly when the heart of the claims for l\·1r. Mmver's direct injuries is Baird's

.
neg11gent
t herapy. 17
CONCLUSION
This Court should recognize that Baird and The Children's Center ov-/ed a duty to

:Mr. Mm·ver. This is consistent ,,,ith this Cami's rulings in similar contexts which are in
hannony with the better-reasoned rulings from other jurisdictions that advance balanced
17

Amici also stray into unhelpful speculation about how claims might look if new
legislation were passed regulating false reports of abuse, or if 11.r. Mower could pursue
some unknown administrative remedy ,vith the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing. Amici Br. at 25. To the extent such remedies came to exist, they
,vould not preclude :Mr. Mower's malpractice claim for his direct injuries.
20
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policies to protect patients and also the reputation, emotional health and parent-child
relationships of their innocent parents.
This Court should reverse the dismissal of :Mr. Mower's negligence/malpractice
claim and remand for fu11her proceedings.
DATED this 13th day of March 2017.
DURH.~\1 JO:'.\~S & PTh"EGAR, P.C.

/s/ DouQ:las B. Thaver
David L. Arrington
Douglas B. Thayer
Mark R. Nelson
Attomeys for Appellant
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: Mathes v. DRD Knoxville Med. Clinic, No. E2010-01809-COA-R3CV,
2011 WL 1402879 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2011) (unpublished).
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Mathes v. ORD Knoxville Medical Clinic, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2011)
2011 WL 1402879

2011 WL 1402879
Only the Westlaw citation is currently aYailable.
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OPil'\'10~

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, J.
*1 This is an appeal from the trial court's grant
of separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court
determined that Appellants had failed to comply with the
written notice and certificate of good faith requirements
of the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, and had failed
to state a claim for vicarious liability based on theories of
agency or joint venture. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand, concluding that Appellants' claims of direct

negligence do not sound in medical malpractice: but that
Appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted with respect to vicarious liability based on agency
or joint venture.

I. Background Facts & Procedure
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of separate
motions to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.0:?.(6)
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Thus, the following facts are drawn from the
parties' respective pleadings.
On September 15, 2008, at approximately i:15 a.m.,
Paul Davis and Alicia Mathes collided in an automobile
accident in Knox County. Earlier that same day,
Mr. Davis had been administered his daily dose of
methadone at DRD Knoxville Medical Clinic, a drug
rehabilitation center that provides treatment to patients
with opiate addictions. The clinic treats its patients
through counseling and dispensing methadone. Dr.
Steven Ritchie 'Nas the medical director and an employee
of the clinic, and part of his job was to oversee
the administration of methadone to certain patients,
including Mr. Davis.
On September 11, 2009, Mrs. Mathes, along with
her husband, Scott Mathes (together "Plaintiffs" or
"Appellants"), filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of
Knox County. The complaint named as defendants DRD
Knoxville Medical Clinic, DRD Knoxville Medical Clinic,
Inc. (together "DRD" or the "Clinic''), Dr. Ritchie, and
Mr. Davis. The complaint alleged negligence on the part
of Mr. Davis, direct negligence on the part of DRD and
Dr. Ritchie, and vicarious liability on the part of DRD
under theories of agency and joint venture.
Specifically, the complaint averred that, on the morning
of the automobile accident, DRD administered a daily
dose of methadone to Mr. Davis, who was alleged to have
been a long-time methadone user and patient of the Clinic.
As alleged in the complaint, methadone, and long-tenn
methadone use, can cause drowsiness, severe sedation,
sleepiness, and blurred vision, which can render a person
under its influence unable to perform complex tasks
such as operating an automobile. The complaint further
claimed that, contrary to Clinic policy, DRD provided
Mr. Davis \·vith his methadone dose before rece1vmg
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payment. Consequently, after recetvmg his dose, Mr.
Davis was allegedly instructed and allowed to leave the
Clinic to obtain cash from an automated teller machine in
order to make his payment.
The automobile accident allegedly occurred while Mr.
Davis v.·as retrieving funds to pay for his methadone dose.
The complaint alleged that neither DRD nor Dr. Ritchie
warned Mr. Davis of the side effects of methadone use or
the danger of driving after receiving his dose. With regards
to DRD and Dr. Ritchie, the complaint alleged that they
owed a duty of care to Appellants, as their conduct in
instructing and allowing Mr. Davis to drive while under
the influence of methadone created a foreseeable "zone of
risk" to innocent third parties.

*2 Appellants alleged that DRD and Dr. Ritchie
breached their duty in the following v.·ays, as stated in the
complaint:
l. Failing to determine if Davis was impaired before
sending him for cash;

2. Failing to warn Davis that he should not drive;
3. Allowing Davis to leave while under the influence of
methadone;

4. Failing to properly monitor and/or supervise Davis
while he was under the influence of methadone;

5. Failing to implement a proper procedure for
monitoring and supervising patients (such as Davis)
after they received methadone doses that would
have prevented Davis from driving away from the
Clinic while under the influence of methadone and
subsequently causing an accident;
6. Fail[ing] to intervene to prevent Davis from driving
from the Clinic while under the influence of methadone
and, instead, expressly directing and/or allowing Davis
to do so: and,
7. Failing to provide Davis \Vith appropriate
transportation for the purpose of him obtaining cash for
payment of this debt to the Clinic.
Mrs. Mathes sought damages for her medical expenses,
pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment, emotional distress,
lost \1-·ages, vocational impairment, and pennanent
physical impairment. Mr. Mathes sought damages for

loss of consortium. Appellants' complaint prayed for
compensatory damages in the amount of four-million
dollars.
DRD filed its answer on January 20, 2010, in which it
admitted that Mr. Davis was a patient of the Clinic,
and that, on September 8. 2008, at 6:35 a.m., DRD
administered to Mr. Davis his daily methadone dose.
DRD denied that it had administered the dose before
receiving payment from Mr. Davis, and also denied that
it had instructed or allowed Mr. Davis to leave the Clinic
to obtain funds for payment. More generally, DRD's
answer denied liability for negligence or vicarious liability
under Appellants' theories of agency or joint venture. Dr.
Ritchie's answer is not contained in the appellate record.
On September, 28, 2010, Appellants obtained a default
judgment against Mr. Davis, who is not a party to this
appeal.
On February 17, 2010, DRD filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P.
12.02(6) motion to dismiss, alleging that Appellants had
failed to comply with the requirements of the Tennessee
Medical Malpractice Act, specifically the written notice
requirement of Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-121 and the
certificate of good faith requirement of Tenn.Code Ann.

§ 29-26-122. 1 On March 5, 2010, Dr. Ritchie also
filed a motion to dismiss adopting and incorporating by
reference the memorandum supporting DRD's motion
to dismiss. The remaining defendants, Dr. Ritchie and
DRD (together "Appellees"), contended that Appellants'
complaint sounded in medical malpractice, and not in
ordinary negligence, and that Appellants had failed to
comply with the requirements of the Medical Malpractice
Act.
Appellants filed a response on March 9, 2010. In their
response, Appellants admitted that they did not comply
with the written notice requirement or the certificate of
good faith requirement, but maintained that neither was
required because their complaint sounded m ordinary
negligence and not in medical malpractice.
*3 The trial court held hearings on the motions to dismiss
on March 12, 2010, and !\1arch 31, 2010. Following
these hearings, the trial court dismissed all claims against
Dr. Ritchie and the claims of direct negligence against
DRD. The trial court found, by order entered July 5,
2010, that "Tennessee's Medical Malpractice Act applies
to plaintiffs' claims against defendants." DRD's motion

2
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to dismiss did not address Appellants' claims for vicarious
liability based on theories of agency and joint venture;
therefore, those claims remained. On June 24 1 2010, DRD
filed a second motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
moving the court to dismiss Appellants' agency and joint
venture claims. Appellants filed their response on July 19,
2010. Following a hearing, on July 23, 2010, the trial court
entered an order, on July 29, 2010, dismissing Appellants'
remaining claims and making the judgment final pursuant
to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.

II. Issues Presellted
Appellants timely appealed, raising the following issues
for review, as restated from their brief:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in dismissing
Appellants' direct negligence claims against DRD and
Dr. Ritchie based upon a finding that the claims
sounded in medical malpractice?
(2) Whether the trial court erred in dismissing
Appellants' claims of vicarious liability against DRD
based on agency or joint venture theories for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted~

III. Sta11dard of Re11iew
A Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss a complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Lanier v. Rains,
229 S.W.3d 656. 660 (Tenn.2007). It admits the truth
of all relevant and material allegations, but asserts that
such allegations do not constitute a cause of action as a
matter of law. See Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 47
(Tenn.1997). \Vhen considering a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
we are limited to an examination of the complaint alone.
See Wolcotts Fin. Servs., Inc. 1•. McReynolds, 807 S.W.2d
708. 710 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990). The basis for the motion
is that the al1egations in the complaint, when considered
alone and taken as true, are insufficient to state a claim
as a matter of law. See Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d
188,190 (Tenn.1975). In short, a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6)
motion to dismiss seeks only to determine whether the
pleadings state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
and such a motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the

complaint not the strength of the plaintiff's proof. Bell
ex rel. Snyder 1•. Icard, 986 S.\V.2d 550, 554 (Tenn.1999).
In considering such a motion, the court should construe
the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, taking all
the allegations of fact therein as true. See Cook ex rel.
Uithoven 1·. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 934,
938 (Tenn.1994). However, we are not required to accept
as true factual inferences or conclusions of law. Riggs v.
Burson. 941 S.W ..2d 44, 47-48 (Tenn.1997). A.n appellate
court should uphold the grant of a motion to dismiss only
when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of a claim that will entitle him or her to relief.
foung v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59~ 63 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, this Court is presented
with matters of law, thus, our review is de novo with
no presumption of correctness. Carvell v. Bottoms. 900
S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tenn.1995).

IV. Analysis
A. Medical Malpractice versus Ordinary l'legligence

*4 We must first determine whether Appellants' claims
of direct negligence sound in ordinary negligence or
medical malpractice. The issue is relevant here because,
before proceeding in a malpractice case, a plaintiff must
fulfill certain procedural requirements. Specifically, it
is undisputed that Appellants provided neither written
notice, as required by Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)
( 1) 2 , nor a certificate of good faith, as required by
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 29-26-122. 3 Failure to adhere to these
procedural requirements may lead to dismissal of the
complaint. See Tenn.Code ..-!\nn. §§ 29-26-121(b); 29-26122(a). However, these procedural requirements do not
apply to a claim for ordinary negligence.
"The distinction between medical malpractice and
negligence is a subtle one, for medical malpractice is but a
species of negligence and no rigid analytical line separates
the two." Gunter v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 121 S.W.3d 636,639
(Tenn.2003) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
The Tennessee Supreme Court recently addressed the
standards for distinguishing between ordinary negligence
and medical malpractice in Estate of French v. Stratford
House, No. E2008-00539-SC-Rl 1-CV,-S.W.3d--,
2011 WL 238819 (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2011).
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The elements of a claim for common law negligence
include: "( 1) a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff;
(2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that
amounts to a breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4)
cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, cause." £stare
of French, 2011 WL 238819, at *5. Medical malpractice
claims, on the other hand, are specifically governed by
the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, which essentially
codified the elements of common law negligence. Id.
(citing Gunter, 121 S.W.3d at 639). Tenn.Code Ann. §
29-26-115 requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action to prove the following statutory elements: (1) the
recognized standard of professional care in the specialty
and locality in which the defendant practices; (2) that
the defendant failed to act in accordance with the
applicable standard of care; and (3) that as proximate
result of the defendant's negligent act or omission, the
claimant suffered an injury which otherwise would not
have occurred. Tenn.Code Ann.§ 29-26-115(a) 4 ; see also
Estate of French, 2011 WL 238819, at *5.
Tennessee courts have embraced the following standard
for distinguishing between ordinary negligence and
medical malpractice:
[\\!]hen a claim alleges negligent
conduct which constitutes or bears
a substantial relationship to the
rendition of medical treatment by
a medical professional, the medical
malpractice statute is applicable.
Conversely, when the conduct
alleged is not substantially related to
the rendition of medical treatment
by a medical professional, the
medical malpractice statute does not
apply.

Gunter, 121 S.W.3d at 641 (citing fiVeiner ,.. Lenox Hill
Hosp., 673 N.E.2d 914, 916 (N.Y.1996)); see also Estate of
French. 2011 WL 238819, at *6.
*5 Likewise, this Court has explained that:
Medical malpractice cases typically
involve
a medical diagnosis,
treatment or other scientific matters.
The distinction between ordinary
negligence and malpractice turns
on whether the acts or omissions

complained of involve a matter of
medical science or art requiring
specialized skills not ordinarily
possessed by lay persons or whether
the conduct complained of can
instead be assessed on the basis of
common everyday experience of the
trier of fact.
Peete v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., 938 S.W.2d
693, 696 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996) (quoting Graniger v.
Methodist Hosp. Healthcare Sys., Inc., No. 02A0I-9309CV-00201, 1994 WL496781, at *3 (Tenn.Ct.App. Sept. 9,
1994)).

We note that this case does not involve the typical medical
malpractice scenario in which a patient asserts claims
against a healthcare provider for injuries arising out of
medical treatment rendered to him or her. Rather, here,
Appellants were never patients of Appellees, and merely
assert claims that relate to medical treatment provided
to a third party. Appellants argue that this case cannot
involve medical malpractice where a physician-patient
relationship never existed.
Appellants refer us to Tennessee cases in which it is
stated that a physician-patient relationship is a necessary
element ofa medical malpractice action. See, e.g., Pitrm.an
v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tenn.1994) ("[t]he
physician-patient relationship is an essential element
of a cause of action for medical malpractice, but
not for common law negligence"); Bradshaw v. Daniel,
854 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tenn.1993) ("[w]hile it is true
that a physician-patient relationship is necessary to the
maintenance of a medical malpractice action, it is not
necessary for the maintenance of an action based on
negligence"); Estate of Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc.,
958 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997) ("a physicianpatient relationship is a necessary element of a medical
malpractice action").
Our
Supreme
Court discussed
the historical
underpinnings of the physician-patient requirement in
Kelley v. ~Middle Tennessee Emergency Physicians, 133
S.\V.3d 587, 591-93 (Tenn.2004). From the Court's
analysis in that case, it is clear that the requirement of a
physician-patient relationship is, in essence, an analysis of
duty. Id. at 593. A number of Tennessee Supreme Court
cases have held that a medical provider may owe a duty
of care to non-patient third parties for injuries caused
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by the medical provider's negligence if the harn1 which
occurred was reasonably foreseeable. See. e.g., Eswte of
Amosv. Vanderbilt Unfr., 62 S .,·v.3d 133, 138 (Tenn.2001)
(holding that a hospital o,ved a duty to ·warn a former
patient of her possible exposure to the HIV Yirus and
that the patient's husband could recover damages against
the hospital): Tumer \'. Jordan, 957 S.W.2d 815, 818
(Tenn.1997) (holding that a psychiatrist owed a duty of
care to a hospital nurse to protect her from a dangerous,
mentally ill patient); Bradshaw v.. Daniel. 854 S.W .2d 865,
872-73 (Tenn.1993) (holding that a physician of a patient
suffering from Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever owed a
duty of care to warn identifiable third persons in the
patient's immediate family of their risk of contracting the
disease); Wharzon Transp. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d
521, 527 (Tenn.1980) (holding that physician performing
pre-employment physical examination of a truck driver
owed a duty of care to a third party); cf Pirtman v. Upjohn
Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 433-34 (Tenn.1994) (holding that
physician did not owe a duty of care to non-patient where
it was not reasonably foreseeable that non-patient would
ingest medicine prescribed for the physician's patient).
*6 We note that the question of what duty Appellees
owed to Appellants was not an issue that was litigated
or decided by the trial court. Consequently, we decline
to address it on appeal. Nevertheless, we believe that the
lack of a physician-patient relationship between Appellees
and Appellants underscores the fact that Appellants'
claims do not bear a substantial relationship to the
rendition of medical treatment to Mr. Davis. See Estate of
French, 2011 WL 238819, at *6. By analyzing Appellants'
complaint to ascertain the nature and substance of their
claims, see id. at *7, it is clear that Appellants do not
raise any issue related to the quality or effect of the
medical treatment rendered by Appellees to Mr. Davis.
Rather, Appellants allege fault on behalf of Appellees for
instructing and allowing Mr. Davis to leave the Clinic
while impaired by methadone in order to secure payment,
and for failing to implement policies and procedures to
prevent such an outcome.
As detailed above, Appellants specifically assert that
Appellees: (1) failed to detern1ine whether Mr. Davis
,·vas impaired before allowing him to leave the Clinic;
(2) failed to warn Mr. Davis that he should not
drive; (3) allowed Mr. Davis to leave while under the
influence of methadone; (4) failed to properly monitor or
supervise Mr. Davis while he was impaired; (5) failed to

implement proper monitoring and supervising procedures
for patients under the influence of methadone; (6) failed
to intervene to prevent Mr. Davis from leaving the Clinic
,vhile impaired; and (7) failed to provide Mr. Davis with
transportation for the purpose of securing payment. These
are allegations sounding in ordinary negligence and do not
bear a substantial relationship to the medical treatment of
Mr. Davis.
The fact that this case involves health or medical entities
does not, ipso facto, lead us to the conclusion that it
sounds in medical malpractice. Estate of French. 2011
238819, at *6; Gunter, 121 S.W.3d at 640. From our
review of the complaint, Appellants' allegations relate
to Appellees' failure to \Varn, see, e.g., Estate of Doe,
958 S.W.2d at 122, and failure to implement proper
procedures for the protection of third parties, see, e.g.,
Turner v. Steriltek, Inc .. No. M2006-01816-COA-R3CV, 2007 WL 4523157, at *8 (Tenn.Ct.App.2007), and do
not relate to the rendition of medical sen·ices to Mr. Davis.
Appellees contend that the treatment of a methadone
patient involves specialized training and knowledge of
scientific matters. Vve note that the treatment of Mr. Davis
is not itself at issue here; rather, it is the handling of Mr.
Davis after he ·was treated, and the effect such handling
had on the safety of the public at-large. Appellees argue
that their assessment of Mr. Davis, in determining whether
or not he was capable of leaving the Clinic after receiving
his dose, was a decision involving specialized medical
skill and training. While we concede that expert medical
testimony might be needed to assist a jury in detern1ining
the proper handling of a patient treated with methadone,
this fact alone does not place this case within the medical
malpractice realm. See Estate of Doe. 958 S.\V.2d at 122-

..,,,
.:,._,.

*7 Appellees argue that any duty that they may owe
to Appellants arises solely out of the medical treatment
of Mr. Davis. We disagree. While it may be true
that Appellees would not be named defendants but for
the treatment of Mr. Davis, the specific allegations of
negligence made by Appellants relate solely to acts or
omissions made by Appellees after the rendition of such
treatment. Moreover, as discussed above, the allegations
do not, in any way, allege fault ·with the medical treatment
provided to Mr. Davis. The allegations instead attribute
fault arising from the handling of Mr. Davis after his
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treatment and the danger such handling may have posed
to members of the public.
Based on the limited facts before us on a motion to
dismiss, we believe that any duty Appellees may have
owed to Appellants, is one of a health care provider
to a non-patient third party. See, e.g., Estare of Amos
v. Vanderbilt Univ .. 62 S.W.3d 133. 138 (Tenn .2001);
Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 872-73 (Tenn.1993);
FFharton Tra11Sp. Corp. r. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521, 527
(Tenn.1980); Estale of Jane Doe, 958 S.\\T.2d at 122-23;
Turner r. Steriltek. Inc., 2007 WL 4523157, at *8. These
cases each sounded in ordinary negligence, and we discern
that the acts or omissions alleged in Appellants' complaint
are analogous.
For these reasons, we conclude that Appellants' claims
of direct negligence against Appellees DRD and Dr.
Ritchie sound in ordinary negligence, and not in medical
malpractice. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's
judgment dismissing Appellants' claims for failure to
comply with the procedural requirements of the Medical
Malpractice Act. \\ 7e specifically note that our decision
does not hold that Appellees owed a duty of care to
Appellants, but merely holds that Appellants' complaint
alleges a duty and breach of duty that sounds in ordinary
negligence.

From our review of the record. the basis for Appellants'
claims of vicarious liability based on agency can be found
in the following paragraphs of the complaint:
*8 10. Contrary to Clinic policy, instead of having
to pay for his methadone dose before receiving it,
Davis was provided and administered his dose without
payment. Instead, he was instructed and allowed by the
Clinic to leave the Clinic after receiving his methadone
dose for the purpose of traveling to an A TM to obtain
cash to pay for his methadone dose. Neither the Clinic
and/or Ritchie inquired as to how Davis was going to
travel to obtain the requested cash. As such, Davis, at
all times material, was an agent of and/or joint venturer
with the Clinic making the Clinic jointly and severally
liable and/or vicariously liable for the acts of Davis.

13. While acting as the agent for and/or as a joint
venturer with the Clinic in obtaining cash for payment
for his methadone dosage, Davis negligently caused the
accident at issue. At the time of the accident, Davis
was pharmaceutically impaired by the methadone. His
pharmaceutical impairn1ent was a proximate cause of
the accident at issue.
17. As set forth, supra, the Clinic (DRD, Inc. and/or
DRD) are jointly and severally liable and/or vicariously
liable for the proximate negligence of Davis as he was
an agent and/or joint venturer with the Clinic.

B. Agency
We next turn to the trial court's grant of Appellee DRD's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim of vicarious
liability based on a theory of agency. "In the broadest
sense, an agency relationship is one wherein the principal
authorizes the agent to act for the principal's benefit but
at the same time retains the right to control the agent's
conduct.'' Hussman Refrigeration, Inc. v. South Pittsburgh
Assocs., 697 S.W.2d 588, 592 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985). The
formation of an agency relationship does not require an
explicit agreement. contract, or understanding between
the parties. and can be established \\··hether the parties
intended to create one or not. H"/1i1e v. Revco Discoum
Drug Centers, Inc., 33 S.W.3d 713, 723 (Tenn.2000). "An
element of the agency relationship is that the object
of the contract be for the benefit of the principal."
l\7idiffer l'. Clinclifield R. Co., 600 S.\V.1d 142, 245
(Tenn.Ct.App.1980) (citing Foster Trailer Co. 1·. U.S. Fid.
& Gllar. Co .. 228 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tenn.1950)).

Based on these allegations, we must agree ·with the trial
court and conclude that the complaint does not state
a claim for vicarious liability based on agency. First,
these allegations do not indicate what, if any, benefit
the purported principal, DRD, stood to gain by virtue
of an agency relationship with Mr. Davis . .\iidiffer, 600
S.W.2d at 245. Rather, the complaint alleges a standard
commercial transaction in ,,·hich Mr. Davis was rendered
medical services and sought to secure funds with which to
pay his bill. Mr. Davis was pursuing his own interests. not
those ofDRD, in paying his debt. Payment of the amount
owed cannot itself be considered a benefit to DRD, and
an agency relationship is not created simply because a
creditor requests payment. Second, it is axiomatic that a
principal can only do through an agent that which it has
the power to do itself. 2A C.J.S. Agency§ 129 (201 I). DRD
could not have gone to Mr. Davis' bank and withdrawn
funds from his account in order to pay the amount o,ved.
This fact illustrates that Mr. Davis ,vas acting on his own
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behalf and was not pursuing the interests of DRD when
he left the Clinic.
Appellants use of the word "agency," or even the
allegation of an agency relationship, is not sufficient to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. These
are merely legal conclusions which are not required to
be taken as true. Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44, 47-48
(Tenn.1997). Appellants must allege sufficient facts that, if
proven, would give rise to liability. Trau-.Med of America,
Inc. 1•. Allstaie Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691,697. They failed
to do so.
For these reasons, we conclude that Appellants' complaint
failed to state a claim for vicarious liability based on
agency. Consequently, we affinn the judgment of the trial
court in this respect.

C. Joint Venture

*9 \"Ve last address Appellants' claims of vicarious
liability against Appellee ORD based on joint venture,
1
\ \ hich the trial court likewise dismissed. The Tennessee
Supreme Court has defined a joint venture as:
[A]n association of persons with
intent, by way of contract, express
or implied, to engage in and carry
out a single business adventure
for joint profit, for which purpose
they combine their efforts, property,
money, skill, and knowledge, but
\vithout creating a partnership in the
legal or technical sense of the tem1,
or a corporation, and they agree
that there shall be a community
of interest among them as to the
purpose of the undertaking, and
that each coadventurer shall stand
in the relation of principal, as well
as agent, as to each of the other
coadventurers, with an equal right
of control of the means employed to
carry out the common purpose of
the adventure.

Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Lobban, 315 S.W.2d 514,
520 (Tenn.1958).

Thus, it is often said that a joint venture between two
parties requires "a common purpose, some manner of
agreement among them and an equal right on the part
of each to control both the venture as a whole and
any relevant instrumentality." Dewberry v. ~~1addox, 755
S.W ..2d 50, 56 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988) (quoting Cecil r.
Hardin, 5i5 S.W.2d 268. 271 (Tenn.1978)).
From our review of the record, the only allegations of a
joint venture in the complaint are those excerpted above
that also allege an agency relationship. Based on those
allegations, we conclude that the trial court correctly
dismissed Appellants' joint venture claim for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
First, the complaint does not allege that DRD and Mr.
Davis intended to "carry out a single business adventure
for joint profit ." See Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc., 315
S.W.2d at 520. The factual allegations merely indicate
that the parties carried out a routine transaction for
medical services. Neither party profited from Mr. Davis'
excursion. Rather, DRD \vas paid the money owed to it,
and Mr. Davis satisfied a monetary obligation.
Second, the allegations do not indicate that there was
a "common purpose" between DRD and Mr. Davis.
As discussed above, when Mr. Davis left the Clinic to
obtain funds to pay his bill, both parties were pursuing
their mvn respective interests. Appellants contend, in their
brief, that we should infer the common purpose to be the
maintenance of a relationship between methadone patient
and provider. Appellants argue that the common purpose
to maintain such a relationship can be inferred by the
allegation that DRD, contrary to its own policy, provided
methadone to Mr. Davis prior to receiving payment and
allowed him to later retrieve payment. \Ve note only that,
v.'hile we must construe allegations in a plaintiffs favor
and accept factual allegations as true, we are not required
to take as true inferences drawn from the facts. Riggs
l'. Burson, 941 S.W.2d at 47-48. We believe that such a
common purpose is not fairly dra ,,,n from the facts as
alleged.
*10 Third, the complaint does not allege an equal right of
control of the venture and the relevant instrumentalities.
See Dewberry v. Maddox, 755 S.W.2d at 56. The complaint
uses words such as "instructed" and "allowed" to describe
DRD's actions in relation to Mr. Davis. These words
do no indicate parties on equal footing. Conversely, the
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complaint does not allege that DRD had any right to
control Mr. Davis' transportation to, or acquisition of
money from, the automated teller machine. If anything,
the factual al1egations in the complaint imply that
DRD did not have the right to control the relevant
instrumentalities because it states that "neither the Clinic
and/or Ritchie inquired as to how Davis was going to
travel to obtain the requested cash. '1
As noted above, simply using the words .:joint venture" or
alleging a joint venture relationship without alleging facts
sufficient to establish such a relationship is not sufficient
to state a claim. These are merely legal conclusions which
we are not required to accept as true. Riggs v. Burson,
941 S.W.2d at 47--48. After reviewing the complaint, it
is simply not possible to match the elements of a joint
venture with the facts as alleged by Appellants.
For these reasons, we conclude that Appellants' complaint
failed to state a claim for vicarious liability based on joint
venture. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court in this respect.

V. Conclusio11
After reviewing the record, we conclude that Appellants'
complaint sounds in ordinary negligence, not medical
malpractice. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's
judgment dismissing Appellants' claims of direct
negligence against Appellees DRD and Dr. Steven
Ritchie. However, we affirm the trial court's judgment
dismissing Appellants' claims of vicarious liability against
Appellee DRD based on theories of agency and joint
venture because Appellants have failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted with respect to these
theories. The case is remanded to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs of this
appeal are assessed one-half to Appellees, DRD Knoxville
Medical Clinic, DRD Knoxville Medical Clinic, Inc., and
Dr. Steven Ritchie, and one-half to Appellants, Alicia and
Scott Mathes, and their surety.
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Footnotes

1

DRD's answer, filed January 20, 2010, also raised Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) defenses as provided in Rule 12.

2

Tenn.Code Ann.§ 29-26-121 (a)(1) provides:
Any person, or that person's authorized agent, asserting a potential claim for medical malpractice shall give written
notice of the potential claim to each health care provider that will be a named defendant at least sixty (60) days
before the filing of a complaint based upon medical malpractice in any court of this state.
Tenn.Code Ann.§ 29-26-122(a) provides, in relevant part:
In any medical malpractice action in which expert testimony is required by § 29-26-115, the plaintiff or plaintiffs
counsel shall file a certificate of good faith with the complaint. If the certificate is not filed with the complaint, the
complaint shall be dismissed, as provided in subsection (c), absent a showing that the failure was due to the failure of
the provider to timely provide copies of the claimant's records requested as provided in§ 29-26-121 or demonstrated
extraordinary cause ....
Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-26-115(a) provides:

3

4

In a malpractice action, the claimant shall have the burden of proving by evidence as provided by subsection (b ):
(1) The recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession and the specialty thereof, if any,
that the defendant practices in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community at the time
the alleged injury or wrongful action occurred;
(2) That the defendant acted with less than or failed to act with ordinary and reasonable care in accordance with
such standard; and
(3) As a proximate result of the defendant's negligent act or omission, the plaintiff suffered injuries which would not
otherwise have occurred.
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